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$UHWKHSHRSOHWKLQNLQJZKDW0LOOHU·VWKLQNLQJ" 
 
David 0LOOHU·V LQWHUSUHWDWLYH approach to theorising about justice, articulated most explicitly in 
his book Principles of Social Justice (1999, from here on PSJ) but informing his work up to and 
including the recent Strangers in Our Midst (2016), takes SHRSOH·V existing beliefs to play a 
fundamental constitutive role in the development of normative principles. For Miller, the job of 
the political theorist is to uncover and present back to people ´WKH GHHS VWUXFWXUH RI D VHW RI
everyday beliefs that, on the surface, are to some degree ambiguous, confused and 
FRQWUDGLFWRU\µ ZLWK WKH DLP RI SURGXFLQJ ´D FOHDUHU DQG PRUH V\VWHPDWLF VWDWHPHQW RI WKH
principles WKDWSHRSOHDOUHDG\KROGµ. It follows thDWDWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHLVWR´EHWHVWHGLQSDUWE\
LWVFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWKHYLGHQFHFRQFHUQLQJHYHU\GD\EHOLHIVDERXW MXVWLFHµ (1999 p. 51).1 The 
theory RI MXVWLFH WKDW 0LOOHU XQGHUVWDQGV WR EH HPEHGGHG LQ WKH ¶GHHS VWUXFWXUH· RI HYHU\GD\
beliefs in the societies with which he is concerned in PSJ is a contextualist one. Miller identifies 
three relational contexts, each of which have their own distributive principle. A context of 
solidaristic community (like a family or, says Miller, a nation) brings with it the distributive 
principle of need; a context of instrumental association (like a market economy) is governed by 
the principle of desert; and the context of citizenship brings with it the principle of equality. I am 
going to call this the ¶Srinciple-to-FRQWH[WIUDPHZRUN· 
 The justification for taking an interpretative approach that I will focus on here is an 
epistemological one.2 For Miller, if the theorist reaches conclusions about WKH ¶WUXWK·RI justice 
radically divergent from public opinion: 
then we must ask whether the criteria by which the philosopher distinguishes truth from falsehood 
are the same as those used by the ordinary person. If they are the same, why is there such a radical 
GLYHUJHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH SKLORVRSKHU·V FRQFOXVLRQV DQG WKRVH RI WKe ordinary person? If, by 
contrast, the philosopher appeals to different criteria, what warrant does he have for thinking that 
they lead to objective truth? How can he distinguish between a mere conviction that the truth is to 
                                                          
1 %XWRQO\´LQSDUWµ,UHWXUQWRWKLVEHORZ 
2 This is not the only justification ² another is related to the notion that any principles of justice the theorist 
RIIHUVVKRXOGEHSODXVLEO\¶DFWLRQ-JXLGLQJ·see for example Miller, 2013).  
be found by the method of inquiry he favours, and a warranted belief that this is the case? (1999, 
p. 52) 
These are rhetorical questions; Miller believes there are no good answers.  
But do the people in fact think what Miller thinks they think? I will here first suggest that 
we have reason to at least be doubtful about that. Moreover, even if the people do indeed 
endorse the principle-to-context framework, there remains room for dispute about what follows 
from the framework politically. On the other hand, if we suppose that there is in fact a 
disconnect between what the public believes and what Miller imputes to them, then it is not clear 
what conclusions about justice should be drawn, because Miller also appears to have 
independent reasons to prefer his contextualist theory.  
 
 In PSJ, Miller refers to empirical data to ¶WHVW· the principle-to-context framework as an 
interpretation of what the people think about justice. But at first blush, there appears to be an 
obvious problem. Miller appeals to survey data (amongst other things) in which respondents 
answer in a certain way about, for example, the place of desert in judgements about just 
distributions. But of course, there is never consensus among the respondents; for every majority 
that responds one way there is a minority that responds in a different way, however much 
triangulation of studies is carried out. What then enables the assertion WKDW ¶WKH SHRSOH· WKLQN
something?   
, XQGHUVWDQG 0LOOHU·V approach here to be to draw a distinction between levels of 
disagreement. Although the data evidence disagreement among persons, it does not follow that 
those persons must be disagreeing about the principle-to-context framework; rather, they might 
simply be disagreeing about how best to categorise the context at hand, or about which context 
takes priority, while agreeing in the abstract about which distributive principles rightly apply to 
which contexts. So, for example, disagreements in the survey data about whether it is okay for an 
employee to use their influence to secure a job for a relative are said by Miller to evidence 
disagreement about whether the context that takes precedence is th
context of the instrumental association (1999: 36). The assertion that the principle-to-context 
framework itself is consistent with public belief then survives.3  
 This however is not the only possible interpretation of the data: an alternative is that 
people in fact do disagree about the framework itself, and it is that deeper disagreement that 
explains the divergent responses. The empirical data cannot resolve this issue of their own 
interpretation. Surveys, for instance, tend merely to ask people to select from given options ² we 
do not thereby learn why they select the option(s) that they do. Qualitative studies, in which 
SDUWLFLSDQWV·WKRXJKWVDERXWMXVWLFHDUHGHHSO\SUREHG and which therefore provide more insight, 
are unfortunately less well represented in the data Miller appeals to. It is possible, then, that 
genuine deep disagreement about principle is being inappropriately rendered as merely a series of 
misunderstandings about context, or disagreements about context priority.   
One worried about this possibility might additionally wonder why, if what the public 
thinks rightly plays a constitutive role in determining principles of justice, the empirical exercise 
GRHVQ·W FRPH ILUVW UDWKHU WKDQ RQO\ DW WKH SRLQW DW Zhich confirmation of a pre-constructed 
theory is sought. One reason potentially to worry about the order in which Miller does things is 
that by the time we get to the hard data, there has already been considerable intellectual 
investment in the theory to be tested. And indeed, the elements of the theory sketched in PSJ can 
be, I think, understood to proceed from earlier work such as Market, State and Community (1989): 
the three elements of that ERRN·V title being exemplary of the three contexts of instrumental 
association, citizenship, and community. None of us is immune to ¶motivated reasoning· (see 
Alice %DGHULQ·V FRQWULEXWLRQ to this exchange for discussion): might there be a type of 
confirmation bias at work in the interpretation of the data, that leads one to consider that that 
data ´VWDQGVupµWKHWKHRU\ p. 61), rather than simply fails to falsify it? 
                                                          
3 A second possible response to the variation evident in the data is to begin by accepting the inevitable 
H[LVWHQFHRISULQFLSOHGGLVDJUHHPHQWDQGWKHQWRPDNHFOHDUWKDWE\¶ZKDWWKHSHRSOHWKLQN·LVPHDQW¶ZKDW
WKHPDMRULW\WKLQN·7KLVVHHPVWREHKLQWHGDWZKHQ0LOOHUUHFRJQLVHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKRVHZLWK´GHYLDQW
YLHZVµSZKLFKZHPLJKW LQWHUSUHWDVWKRVHZKRVHEHOLHIVDERXWMXVWLFHGRQRWFRUUHVSRQGWR
the principle-to-context framework. Even if we assume that the number of these deviants is small, 
KRZHYHULW·VQRWFOHDUKRZWKH\VKRXOGUHODWHWRWKHVRFLHW\WKH\ILQGWKHPVHOYHVLQLIMXVWLFHLVFRQVWLWXWHG
E\ZKDW ¶WKHSHRSOH· WKLQNDQG\HW ,GRQRW WKLQN WKHVDPHZD\ZKDWQRUPDWLYHDXWKRULW\GRHV MXVWLFH
have for me?   
Perhaps this thought gets things wrong. Miller may respond that even though it is true 
that he already had a favoured theory before consulting the ¶hard· empirical data in PSJ, this 
does not mean that that theory was not developed in the first place via a process of social 
interpretation. Miller is, after all, a person in the world: he can claim to have developed his initial 
contextualist theory via an ongoing ¶VRIW· interpretation of public beliefs and sentiments, in a 
more Walzerian vein: from the fact he had a theory before coming to consult the hard data it 
does not follow that that theory must have been constructed, in a Platonic manner, via a process 
of abstract reasoning divorced from existing political practice. And since Miller is a person in the 
world who cannot help but interpret society as it confronts him, reference to the ¶hard· empirical 
data could never, in practice, come first. But while this may all be right, any such response would 
also seem to amount to recognition that the ¶hard· data in fact plays a less important role in the 
interpretative methodology than advertised, even in PSJ. We should also want to know more 
about exactly what is LQYROYHG LQ WKHSULRU ¶VRIW·SURFHVVRI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKDWGHOLYHUVXV the 
theory in the first place EXW LV QRW H[SOLFLWO\ FRQWDLQHG ZLWKLQ 0LOOHU·s articulation of his 
methodology.4 
Suppose, notwithstanding these concerns, that the principle-to-context framework is 
indeed an accurate representation of the deep structure of collective public belief. There remains 
the question of what can properly be said to follow, in terms of specific political 
recommendations, as an implication of that structure. There is significant scope for divergence 
on this secondary question, even assuming agreement at that deeper level. An affinity can be 
GUDZQZLWKWKHMXVWLILFDWRU\´LQWHUQDOLVPµRI%HUQDUG:LOOLDPV)RU:LOOLDPV´$KDVUHDVRQWR
O only if he could reach the conclusion to O by a sound deliberative route from the motivations 
hH DOUHDG\ KDVµ :LOOLDPV  S 35). Miller may want to say something similar, perhaps: 
¶3ROLF\2LVMXVW for Society A only if it can be shown to be an implication of the deep structure of 
belief DERXW MXVWLFH 6RFLHW\ $ DOUHDG\ KROGV· $V :LOOLDPV IUHHO\ DGPLWV however ´WKH
                                                          
4 In her review of Strangers in Our Midst, Linda Bosniak notes that the precise method of social 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ0LOOHUWKHUHXQGHUWDNHVLVXQFOHDU:KLOHKHGRHVVWLOO´EULHIO\FLWHµVRPHSROOLQJDQGVXUYH\
data, there also seems to be a more general DQGXQGHUVSHFLILHGDWWHPSWWR´LQWXLWWKH]HLWJHLVWµ%RVQLDN
2017, pp. 96-7).  
GHOLEHUDWLYHSURFHVVZKLFKFRXOGOHDGIURP$·VSUHVHQW>PRWLYDWLRQDOVHW@WREHLQJPRWLYDWHGWR2
PD\EHPRUHRUOHVVDPELWLRXVO\FRQFHLYHGµWilliams, 1981, p. 110). But given this variability 
RI ¶DPELWLRQ· DQ\ QXPEHU RI GLIIHULQJ actions, potentially inconsistent with each other, can 
seemingly EH VKRZQ WR OD\ DW WKH HQG RI D ´VRXQG GHOLEHUDWLYH URXWHµ IURP SHUVRQV· H[LVWLQJ
motivations (Forst, 2012, pp. 30-31). Because of this, disagreement about what any one person 
has an internal reason to do seems highly likely, even assuming agreement about the contents of 
the existing motivational set.  
The political implications of the ¶deep structure· of public belief can themselves be more 
or less ¶ambitiously· conceived. For instance, both Miller (1983) and Michael Walzer (1989) 
have endorsed a kind of market socialism. But this is surely not the only possible way to cash out 
the implications of the purported deep structure of public belief.5 Even if you and I both agree 
that the principle of equality applies to the context of citizenship, and the principle of desert to 
the marketplace, we might well not agree that market socialism is a necessary implication of the 
confluence of those two principles; perhaps a cap on top-to-bottom income ratios (something else 
with which Miller has shown sympathy), even where companies stay in private hands, would be 
sufficient; or perhaps something even less ambitious might be thought to do the trick. In other 
words, it is again seemingly quite possible for persons to FRQIURQW WKH VDPH ¶GDWD· ² here, the 
principle-to-context framework itself ² and draw opposing conclusions about it.  
What does this mean for the normative status of any first-order political prescriptions 
Miller makes? One answer is to suppose that at this level, the philosopher does indeed have some 
privileged epistemic status, and does not need to seek correspondence with what the people 
think; if, on the other hand, the philosopher remains constrained to work within the frame of 
¶what the people think·, then it would seem to be the case that they should resist making first-
order political recommendations, because it is inevitable that the people will not think one 
coherent thing. Perhaps the best way to conceive of things here, however, is to treat the 
philosopher as a citizen contributing to political debate like any other, offering their own 
                                                          
5 As Brian Barry put it with particular reference to Walzer, ´/LNHLWRUQRW«WKHUHLVDFRKHUHQWUDWLRQDOH
for the private ownership and control of firms, based on widely diffused ideas about the rights of private 
RZQHUVKLSµ%DUU\S 74) 
interpretation of the political implications of the shared deep structure of belief without any 
pretence or requirement WKDWWKDWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVRUZLOOHYHUEHVKDUHGE\¶WKHSHRSOH·DWODUJH 
But what happens if the deep structure of public belief, as a matter of fact, and as I have 
suggested is quite possible, does not comprise the principle-to-context framework that Miller has 
produced?6 , QRWHG DW WKH RXWVHW WKDW 0LOOHU VD\V D WKHRU\ VKRXOG EH WHVWHG ´LQ SDUWµ E\ LWV
FRUUHVSRQGHQFH ZLWK SXEOLF EHOLHI +H VD\V WKDW ´WKH evidence [about public beliefs] is not 
decisive from a normative point of view unless we can say something more about why a certain 
mode of social relationship makes the corresponding principle of justice the appropriate one to 
XVHµ  S 34). Part of WKDW ¶VRPHWKLQJ PRUH· LV WKH SHUFHLYHG ´ILWWLQJQHVVµ EHWZHHQ WKH
context and the principle; an independent normative appraisal. Public beliefs, however well 
systematised by the theorist, are not in themselves sufficient to ground justice: we must in 
addition find justification for why the content of those beliefs is appropriate. But there is a 
curiosity here. The normative ¶appropriateness· of the link between a given social relationship 
and a given distributive principle presumably remains even if it GLGQ·W accord with what the 
people think. Indeed, as Miller has put it:  
´LWPD\WXUQRXWWKDWSHRSOHLQ>D@VRFLHW\WKDWLQFOXGHVFRQWH[W&IDLOWRDSSO\>SULQFLSOH@3LQWKDW
context; they may not only fail to govern those relationships in the way that P demands, they may 
not even recognise that P is the appropriate principle to apply. In that case, contextualists should have no 
hesitation in saying that they [i.e. the people] have got it wrong, that the society is to that extent 
UDGLFDOO\XQMXVWµ0LOOHUS, my emphasis) 
Contextualists simpliciter might well be able to say this, but how can contextualists who also 
believe in the constitutive relevance of public belief to justice do so? How can Miller anticipate 
telling a society that the principle it endorses is ´radically unjustµ while also being sceptical about 
SKLORVRSKHUV· HSLVWHPLF FDSDFLW\ WR UHDFK QRUPDWLYH FRQFOXVLRQV DW ´UDGLFDO GLYHUJHQFHµ IURP
those of the ordinary person? (1999, p. 52). One answer for a contextualist to offer might be that 
it is possible to tell a society it is radically wrong about a given context of justice only when there 
                                                          
6 Andreas Busen and Thomas Schramme also reflect on this question in their contributions to this critical 
exchange.  
are other contexts of justice which the society gets right, and that can explain to that society why 
WKH FRQWH[W WKH\·YH JRW ZURQJ is wrong for them. In that way, Miller could meet his own 
FRQGLWLRQIRUDYDOLGWKHRU\´WKDW LWVKRXOGEHSRVVLEOHIRUSHRSOHWRFRPHWRDFFHSW LWDQGOLYH
DFFRUGLQJWRLWVSULQFLSOHVµZKHre a component of ¶possibility· is that persons can be plausibly 
persuaded to recognise the theory on the basis of the set of beliefs they already hold (Miller, 
2003, p. 352).  
There could, though, be no correct theory of justice that is completely divorced from what 
the people think about justice. The reason for this is that, as we have seen, the philosopher is 
presumed to have no privileged epistemic vantage point ² when philosophers reach the 
judgement that what the public believes about justice is comprehensively ´ZURQJµ, the appropriate 
reaction is to question the warrant for that judgement. The people are assumed to be competent 
locators of an appropriate ¶GHHSVWUXFWXUH·RI MXVWLFH (even if, as it appears, Miller is willing to 
allow that they may occasionally go partially wrong); the philosopher enters to make that 
structure plain, and to explicate its appropriateness. %XWHYHQLI0LOOHUGRHVQRWWKLQNWKDW¶ZKDW
WKH SHRSOH WKLQN· DQG ZKDW·V QRUPDWLYHO\ DSSURSULDWH will come fully apart in practice, the 
analytic distinction is illuminating, because if, as I have been suggested he might be, Miller is in 
fact wrong about what the people think, he seemingly would find himself in a dilemma: on the 
one hand committed to the notion that the people are essentially the epistemic equals of the 
philosopher; on the other hand of the independent opinion that the contextualist theory he has 
imputed to the people is normatively appropriate, when in fact the people endorse something 
that Miller might consider objectively wrong. ,W·VQRWFOHDUZKDW WKHZD\ forward would be in 
such a scenario ² if a correct theory of justice requires both accordance with what the people 
think and an independent ascription of normative appropriateness, could there here even be 
correct principles of justice? In the interests of protecting the methodology from having to 
confront this kind of difficult scenario, there is always reason to believe that it KDVQ·WRFFXUUHG 
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